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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
State of Utah 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF 
NICK CHONGAS, DECEASED, 
Respondent, 
-vs.-
PAUL C. PORCKER, 
Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF CASE: 
Case 
No. 7206 
It probably will enable the Court to follow the argument 
made herein with more ease if a time table of matters which 
are recited in the Statement of Facts in the Brief of Appellant 
is available for the perusal of this Court. It follows: 
March 1st, 1946: Nick Chongas executes will in favor 
Paul C. Porcker. 
March 11th, 1946: Nick Chongas was committed to State 
Mental Hospital by the District Court 
of Salt Lake County. 
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November -st, 1946: Mr. Chongas was adjudged sane after 
a hearing in open Court, opposed by 
Paul Porcker. 
February 3rd, 1947: Will executed by Nick Chon gas, cut-
~ing Porcker off with a $1.00 legacy. 
February 13th, 1947: Order of recommital signed by 
Judge John A. Hendricks of the 
Weber County District Court. 
February 24th, 1947: William Lepas petitions for letters 
of Guardianship. Letters being is-
sued March 20th, 1947. 
june 30th, 1947: Chongas petitions for restoration to 
capacity, alleging release from State 
Mental Hospital. 
September 26th, 1947: Chongas restored to capacity by 
Second District Court. 
March 26th, 1948: Nick Chon gas dies. 
April 14th, 1948: State Mental Hospital gets around to 
filing notice of release, showing re-
lease made that day; "Condition un-
changed". 
Time has quite a bit to do with this case, and the succession 
of events has vital importance in considering the weight of the 
testimony. Since the question involved principally is whether 
there was evidence to go to the jury on the issue of mental, in-
capacity, the exact character of that evidence must be scrutin-
ized closely. The evidence will be considered under several sub-
heads: 
FIRST: THE ORIGINAL COMMITMENT: 
There is in evidence a certified copy of the record from the 
Third District Court (Salt Lake County) of which the affidavit 
of Paul C. Porcker setting out Nick Chongas to be insane, the 
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warrant of commitment signed by the Judge of that Court, and 
the return on the commitment were admitted in evidence. The 
portion entitled "Physician's Certificate" was not admitted, (Tr. 
80). Refusal of the Court to admit this "Physician's Certificate" 
in evidence is one of the two Assignments of Error in this ap-
peal. (Br. 10). 
The evidence discloses that about March 1st, 1946 Paul 
C. Porcker, (Appellant here, and a half-brother of decedent), 
brought Mr. Chongas to the office of H. A. Soderberg, of coun-
sel for the proponent here, and told Mr. Soderberg that Nick 
wanted a will drawn, (Tr. 52-3). Nick just acquiesced, Mr. 
Porcker doing the talking, although Ghonga~ read it once (Tr. 
52-3; 54-5; 57). Ten days later Appellant swore to an affidavit 
that Mr. Chongas was insane. Mr. Chongas' version of what 
happened is: 
"I made a will to my brother and then I got sick. He came 
up here and asked me to go to Salt Lake and live with him. 
I went over to the bank and got sufficient money to take 
care of my illness, I stayed one day at my brother's and 
then they took me to the County Hospital in Salt Lake City. 
I was there a few days. One morning someone came in and 
picked me up in my night clothes, and the next thing I knew 
I was down in Provo. (He was there two or three months 
and no one knew where he was said the witness who de-
tailed this conversation). And finally Mr. Lepas came to 
see me and says 'We found Nick' ". (Tr. 20). 
This and expense to which the decedent was put, particu-
larly expense in the proceeding for restoration, to sanity, the 
guardian's fee which Mr. Porcker sought to obtain (20-1-2) 
and the loss of the $1,000 he claimed he had drawn from the 
bank and given to Mr. Porcker (Tr. 20; 22; 32) and his belief 
that his half-brother was trying to get his money (Tr. 23) were 
of importance in explanation of the action of the testator in 
cutting off Mr. Porcker with the proverbial dollar. 
This dislike by the testator of Mr. Porcker runs all through 
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the testimony. Mr. Fowles and Mr. Lepas arranged for the re-
lease on probation of decedent some tirrte prior to June 30th, 
1946, without consulting Paul Porcker, as Chongas' guardian 
(Tr. 19), because testator was very bitter ag!linst his half-
brother. Chongas started conversations with Mr. Soderberg 
about changing the will favoring the half-brother while pro-
ceedings for restoration to sanity were in progress (Tr. 33), 
and reiterated his desires to Mr. Soderberg several subsequent 
times before he finally came to see him about drawing the 
will. 
SECOND: RESTORATION TO CAPACITY: 
The petition was filed about August 1, 1946. It was not 
disposed of until November 1st following. Testator had been 
out of the State Mental Hospital (Tr. 15) some time, before 
petition for restoration was filed, on probation to Mr. Lepas. 
The petition was contested (Tr. 14-5), and resulted in an ad-
judication (Prop. Ex. "A") that Chongas was of sound mind, 
capable of taking care of himself and his property, and re-
storing him to capacity. 
THIRD: THE SECOND WILL: 
It appears that after the conversations about the old will 
(Tr. 33) commencing about November 1st, 1946, Mr. Chongas 
came to Mr. Soderberg's office alone some ten days or more 
prior to February 3rd, 1947, (Tr. 31-2) -he was not brought 
there by William Lepas as Appellant erroneously states-Br. 9 
and 16) told Mr. Soderberg he wanted to make a new will, to 
leave Paul out of it; he wanted to leave his friend William Lepas 
something, he told (Tr. 46) of his relatives, that they were 
getting old, and he was not sure all were living; he wanted his 
property to go to his brothers and sisters and Lepas, or their 
survivors (Tr. 47. Mr. Soderberg shortly thereafter drew a will 
(Tr. 31) which was in his office, unsigned, on February 3rd, 
1 1947, when he was told by William Lepas (Tr. 48) that the 
testator was in St. Benedict's Hospital and "wanted the will". 
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Lepas and Soderberg were driven to the Hospital by Theodore 
Stamos (Tr. 49), entered the sick room together, and found Mr. 
Chongas in bed. They had a conversation as to his state of 
health (Tr. 34; 61) in which testator told them he had sugar 
diabetes, and Chongas asked about the will. Mr. Soderberg read 
it to him (Tr. 35; 61) and the testator told Mr. Soderberg that 
he had "left out Christ" (Tr. 35-61-2). Soderberg then wrote in 
the name of Christ Chongas among the legatees. The date was 
changed from January to February. Mr. Stamos then, at tes-
tator's request, read it to him in Greek (Tr. 36; 61); the testator 
asked Lepas to be a witness, and when told Lepas could not be 
a proper witness, requested Stamos and Soderberg to witness 
his signature (Tr. 36; 64) whereupon the will was signed by 
the testator and the witnesses. 
Mr. Soderberg testified to the testamentary capacity of 
Nick Chongas from his knowledge of the testator gained in 
connection with the proceeding for restoration to capacity, his 
talks with him from the time of trial to time the will was signed, 
including the consultation respecting the will in_ January, (Tr. 
38) Mr. Stamos from the conversation had preceding the dis-
cussion of the will, that discussion, and his observation of the 
testator at that time (Tr. 66) also testified that Mr. Chongas 
then was of sound mind and knew what h~ was doing. He had 
known Nick Chongas som~ time. Mr. Fowles from observation 
of testator from the time he was released from the hospital to 
the time the witness became engaged in attendance at the State 
Legislature in January of 1947, also testified ,that Nick Chon gas 
was of sound mind at the time the will was signed. (Tr. 7; 15). 
FOURTH: THE SECOND COMMITMENT: 
The testator went back to State Me'ntal Hospital February 
13th, 1947. There is in evidence both Insane File No. 1049 and 
Probate File No. 7549 of the Second District Court. The first, 
admitted to be the entire file in the matter (Tr. 51) contains a 
paper, largely in blank, upon which William Lepas waived no-
tice of time of hearing of application for admission of Mr. 
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Chongas "an alleged insane person" to the hospital, a minute 
entry which recites that "upon the affidavit of William Lepas, 
filed herein" and the sworn testimony of said Lepas, it is or-
dered that said Nick Chongas be "recommited to the Utah State 
Hospital for care and treatment", and a Order of Reco!flmit-
ment which recites that Chongas had theretofore been recom-
mitted to the State Hospital from Salt Lake County, released 
into the custody of William Lepas, and that " now sur-
render the said Nick Chongas and ask that he be recommitted 
for further treatment at said Utah State Hospital" and orders 
the recommitment. A receipt shows that he was taken to the 
hospital the same day. That is all-except the Notice of Re-
lease of Patient dated April 14th, 1948. 
Mr. Soderberg was present at the time this "recommit-
ment" was taken up, (Tr. 38) as well as testator and Mr. Lepas. 
They had tried to get the testator admitted to the Weber County 
Infirmary at Roy, without success, as "they didn't have a place 
for him" ('!'r. 39) so they went before the judge, to whom 
Chongas said that (Tr. 40) he wanted to go back to Provo for 
treatment, whereupon without any further examination, with 
no physicians present, no testimony as to his mental health, or 
as to his competency, the order was made by the judge. "He 
(Lepas) was the guardian and he requested that he be return-
ed" said Mr. Soderberg (Tr. 49). 
At this point an unusual situation arose. Counsel for Con-
testant asked a question as to presence of the witness at a hear-
ing "wherein he was alleged to be insane", to which proponent 
objected. The following colloquy then took place (Tr. 50-51): 
Mr. Hutchinson: I take it the Court wouldn't sign an 
order recommiting him unless he was. 
The Court: Well sir, you take the wrong position. 
Mr. Hutchinson: In what respect, your Honor? 
The Court: When a person volunteers and wishes him-
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self to go down there we have to have-sign 
a recommitment, or a commitment. 
The Court: We don't sign it thinking he is insane; we 
sign it thinking he will go down there for 
observation. He isn't on a recommitment 
deciding him to be insane. Forms are some-
times used that are not just fitting· of the 
situation." 
Further conversation between counsel and the Court fol-
lowed in which the Court, without objection from counsel, makes 
it clear that the question of the sanity or insanity of testator 
was not raised in connection with the recommitment. We sug-
gest the language above quoted reflects quite accurately just 
what the Court did, a view supported by the wording of the 
order made. 
The second "guardianship" proceeding (Probate File 7549) 
contains a petition by Mr. Lepas asking for letters upon the 
ground that Chongas was "sick and unable to take care of his 
property", reciting his original commitment, his being released 
on probation, and that he had personally asked recommitment 
to the State Hospital. No allegat.ion of mental trouble appears. 
The Court's order appointing a guardian is based upon the find-
ing that Chongas had an estate which needed the care of some 
fit and proper person. There is also in the file a letter from 
the testator, protesting appointment of a guardian, and assert-
ing his fitness to care for his property, an account and report, 
and order discharging the guardian and restoring conduct of 
his affairs to Chongas about September 26th, 1947. No evi-
. dence of importance concerning this appears outside the files. 
FIFTH: OTHER TESTIMONY: 
The only witnesses called by Appellant were one William 
Palitsas, Andrew Meintasis, and one of his counsel, William L. 
Beezley. Palitsas' evidence (Tr. 85-9) had to do with his ex-
periences with Mr. Chongas as a tenant, up to the time that 
7 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
testator left for Salt Lake to live with his brother, just prior to 
the insanity proceeding. It is printed quite extensively in Ap-
pellant's Brief. (Tr. 6-7-8)). It was somewhat contradictory, was 
weakened on some points on cross-examination, but in view of 
the position we take that his condition, prior to his restoration 
to capacity, is not revelant, we shall not discuss it further. 
Andrew Meintasis' testimony (Tr. 81-85) is partially given 
in the Appellant's bfief. (Br. 5). He saw Chongas something 
like a month or two prior to his death, had not seen him for 
several years prior to that time, and at that time Chongas was 
"jumpy" and talked incoherently. He had been told that the 
testator had been in the "Asylum", (Tr. 84) but when asked if 
he formed his opinion of the testator's mental condition with 
that fact in mind, he d-ucked the question completely, and after 
being pressed several times, gave his position as to how he 
formed it as follows (Tr. 85): 
"I made it just like a doctor would. A psychiatrist, I read 
it to thought he. ~asn't all there, and that is my true state-
ment.-That was my opinion, of course. I might have been 
mistaken about it." 
(C) William L. Beezley. This witness was called to im-
peach on one point the testimony of the· Proponent. Mr. Fowles. 
He recalled Mr. Fowles telling him that Chongas was "crazy 
as a bedbug", and Mr. Fowles recalled a quite different version 
of the conversation. (See Appl. Br. 9 for detailed statements of 
the two witnesses). 
(D) Other evidence. 
It appeared that the testator was "thrifty" to the point of 
stinginess, so that he was unwilling to be hospitalized at the 
Dee Hospital, but sought admission to the Weber County In-
firmary and that failing, recommitment to the Utah Mental 
Hospital. (Fowles at Tr. 10); although Mr. Soderberg didn't 
think him "ultra stingy, just saving" (Tr. 53). He later was a 
resident at Weber County Infirmary and died there. 
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SIXTH: OFFERED AND REJECTED TESTIMONY: 
Contestant produced one Dr. Earl Wight, a physician and 
surgeon of Salt Lake City, who, without being sworn, was asked 
a hypothetical question which embraced the statement that 
Chongas was suffering froin dementia praecox at the time of 
his first commitment. The testimony was offered to illustrate 
the use to which Appellant's counsel desired to put the "Phy-
sician's Certificate" contained in the original commitment pa-
pers. The offer was denied, upon the ground that the "Physi-
Cian's Certificate" was not competent to establish that Chongas 
suffered from dementia praecox. The testimony of the doctor 
was not offered in the presence of the jury, and the rulings of 
the Court made thereon are not assigned a$ errors here. 
ARGUMENT 
Appellant's Assignment No. 1 
Respondent contends that the evidence adduced was not 
sufficient to carry to the jury the question of testamentary 
incapacity, and, of course, if that be true, that the motion for 
new trial was rightly denied. 
Moser v. Zion's Co-op Mere. Inst. (Utah Unrep.) 197 
Pac. 2d 136. 
We have no quarrel with the points of law which Appellant 
cites, particularly when the cases from which quotations are 
made are examined. Several of these cases we will discuss sub-
sequently in our brief. At this time we call attention to the fact 
that the Van Hooten and Cissel (not Sissel) will cases involved 
advanced and incurable insanity, and wills which were not con-
sonant with lucid reasoning, while in the Etchen case, the in-
competent was claimed to have been "weak minded, normally 
incompetent, without any natural powers to protect himself" 
which feeble minded condition so claimed naturally involved 
proof of a lifetime condition. See 
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In re Van Hooten's Will, 124 N. W. 886 (Ia.). 
In Re Cissel's Estate, 66 Pac. 2d, 779 (Mont.). 
Etchen v. Texas Company, 199 Pac. 212 (Okla.). 
The question involved here is not admissability of proof as 
to prior and subsequent insanity, guardianships, and similar 
testimony, but is the effect of such testimony upon this will 
herein admitted to probate. It is 'our position that none of the 
testimony offered supports the theory of mental incapacity at 
the time the will was made. Appellant says (App].. Br. 17) that 
he relies upon ( 1) the commitment, (2) recommitment, (3) 
guardianship matters involving person and property of the 
decedent, ( 4) releases of Utah State Mental Hospital, Deceased's 
confinement in St. Benedict's Hospital and the Weber County 
Infirmary, and (5) oral evidence. Analysis of the probative 
, effect of these matters follows: 
FIRST: THE SALT LAKE PROCEEDINGS. T~ere is in 
evidence here the greater part of an insanity proceeding in the 
Salt Lake District Court, and some oral evidence which indi-
cates that, upon the commitment, Appellant obtained letters 
of Guardianship of his half-brother's estate. There is also testi-
mony of one William Palitsas, at whose hotel the testator lived 
for some four or five months prior to removing to the home 
of his brother in Salt Lake for one day, and of which nothing 
need be said except that it indicated that Nick Chongas was 
ill much of the time, thought he was going to die, eccentric, a 
patient in the S. P. Hospital at San Francisco, Palitsas said 
he had no mind at all at the time he went to his brother's. 
This testimony is entirely without probative value because, 
something like eight months later, Nick Chongas was adjudged 
to be sane and restored to capacity upon a proceeding, had 
before the same District Court, contested by the Appellant. 
"An adjudication of insanity is prima facie evidence of 
testamentary incapacity where it precedes the execution 
of the will. In such a case, continuance of insanity will be 
10 
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presumed and the onus cast upon the propounders of the 
will to show that the disqualification has been removed. 
"Having been found a lunatic, the law presumes the 
state of his mind to continue unchanged until the contrary 
is made manifest." 
Clark v. Trail, 1 Met. 35 (Ky.). 
"We think the true rule to be that an adjudication of 
insanity is not conclusive, but prima facie evidence only, 
and that a person who deals with the supposed insane 
person may show at the time the coQ.tract was made he 
had sufficient mental capacity to make it.'.' 
Eagle v. Peterson, 206 S. W. 55; (Ark.) 7 A. L. R. 553. 
"The adjudication in 1902 by the Supreme Court of New 
York, declaring that he was competent to manage himself 
and his affairs was not a conclusive adjudication that he 
was then sane. Prior to that judgment, the legal presump-
tion would be that the insanity, previously adjudged to 
exist, would continue. Thereafter the legal presumption 
would be that he was sane.-After the adjudication in 
1902, that he was competent, the disputable presumption 
that he was sane arising therefrom, was subject to contra-
diction by competent evidence." 
In Re Baker's Estate, 168 Pac. 88 (Cal.). 
"As to point 4, that the judgment of the county court 
adjudging the allottee to be a competent person raised a 
presumption of law which should be overcome by clear and 
convincing evidence, while perhaps true as a general prop-. 
osition of law, it is not applicable here, or at least not con-
trolling, for the reason that there had been several adjudi-
cations in reference to this boy's mind and his competency 
to manage his estate, one of which being subsequent to the 
adjudication relieved upon by the plaintiff in error." 
11 
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Etchen v. Texas Company (Supra-see page 216). 
And where subsequent to an insanity commitment, the 
father of the incompetent procured her discharge from the 
asylum by giving bond, under substantially the proceeding 
authorized by Utah Statutes, and as William Lepas and j. Fran-
cis Fowles procured the release of Nick Chongas, about three 
months, (substantially the same time) after her commitment, 
the question of her sanity being at issue upon a deed, the 
lower court, the commitment being admitted, testimony given 
by some eleven inexpert witnesses as to her want of sanity at 
various times, other than the time of execution, ordered the 
deed cancelled. In that case the appellate court set aside th~t 
judgment, holding that it was without substantial evidence to 
·support it, thus refusing to give any effect to the presumptio. 
of insanity arising from the commitment under the given cir-
cumstances. 
Wade v. Sayre, 123 S. E. 59 (W.Va.). 
Thus the law is that, when the Court adjudged Nick Chon-
gas to be sane, the whole effect, as testimony, of the previous 
commitment, guardianship, and evidence as to his prior condi-
tion, ceased to have weight. It was admitted solely because it 
cast forward a presumption of continuance of the condition 
then shown; it had no weight when that presumption ended upon 
legal proof of sanity. And while as to third persons, the law 
may be that such an adjudication of sanity creates also only a 
new presumption and is not conclusive, where, as here, the 
person who now offers that former adjudication to prove in-
sanity nearly a year later is he who contested the adjudication 
of sanity while the testator was alive, and could be heard to 
speak for himself, he might well be concluded by the judgment 
of November lst, 1946. We thing it unnecessary to press this 
further however: 
"But such evidence as to the mental condition of the 
testator before or after execution of the instrument in 
question is important only in so far as it tends to show 
12 
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mental condition at the time of execution thereof; it has 
no probative value unless it raises an inference of mental 
incapacity at the time of execution of the instrument." 
168 A. L. R. 972, (note and cases cited). 
SECOND: EFFECT OF RECOMMITMENT, AND SUBSE-
QUENT GUARDIANSHIP. 
As to the "recommitment" on February 13th, 1947, and the 
so-called guardianship proceedings which followed~ neither 
were of the character which would raise an inference of subse-
quent insanity, and neither would create a presumption of such 
iP,sanity because of the want of validity of the proceedings. 
(a) Neither could raise a presumption of insanity. 
When Nick Chongas went before the judge of the Weber 
County Court on February 13th, a record was made consisting 
of an order, a waiver of notice signed by William Lepas, and 
a minute entry. That record, and the testimony of Mr. Soder-
berg, together with some comment by the Court appearing in 
the transcript, are all that there is bearing on what took place 
on that day. Mr. Lepas, to whose custody Chongas had been 
released after his first commitment, appeared before judge 
Hendricks, the testator told the judge that he was sick and 
needed treatment, and the judge signed an order of recommit-
ment. Lepas and Soderberg prior that day had sought to get 
the testator admitted to the Weber County Infirmary at Roy, 
but it was full. (Tr. 39) "So Nick says: 'I want to go back to 
Provo, so I can get some medical treatment.-! need some in-
sulin and other care.'-That is what he said in court." No phy-
sicians were there, no examination was made, nothing was said 
about his mental condition. 
The record bears out this testimony. The order of recom-
mitment is of the character which would be used by a person 
to whose custody, under our statute, a person is released from 
the State Hospital, and who is surrendered by that person for 
recommitment. "He (Lepas) was the guardian and he asked 
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that he be returned." (Tr. 49). The minute .entry recites that 
Lepas filed ·an affidavit, but the fact that no such affidavit is 
in the file, and the testimony, uncontradicted, that none was 
filed, dispute that fact, and of course speculation as to what 
the affidavit said, if there was an affidavit, would not aid Ap-
pellant's case. 
It then is the fact that the recommitment affords no evi-
dence that on February 13th, 1947, Nick Chon gas had suffered 
a relapse into his former condition of insanity. 
Subsequent to that,, Lepas filed a petition to be named as 
guardian of Nick Chon gas' estate. (Probate File No. 7549). This 
petition recited that the testator having "entered" the Utah 
State Hospital' about March 13th, 1946, and about August, 
1946, having been released therefrom, having returned to Og-
den and lived with the petitioner until February 13th, 1947, 
had at his own request been "recommitted to said institution, 
and he is now in said HospitaL-That said Nick Chongas is sick 
and unable to take care of himself and his property." The stat-
ute applicable to such appointments, Section 102-13-20, Utah 
Code Ann. 1943, defines those who may require guardianship 
as: 
"Any person, who though not insane, is, by reason of 
old age, disease; weakness of mind, or from any other 
cause, unable, unassisted, to properly manage and take care 
of himself and his prop€rty, and by reason thereof would 
be likely to be deceived or imposed upon by artful and de-
signing persons." 
Upon the effect of such a recommitment, no cases have 
oeen found. We should not expect much success in that search, 
since the proceedings were not· of a character likely to occur 
often, nor likely to be reviewed by appellate tribunals. But on 
the effect of such a guardianship proceeding, there is ample 
authority, and we think that its ratio decendi is equally appli-
cable to the question of the probative value of commitment 
and guardianship. That rational rule of decision is simply that 
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such proceedings, unless founded on insanity, create no pre-
sumptive evidence of insanity. The proceedings here not only 
are not based upon any charges of insanity, but the facts ap-
pearing as to them, uncontradicted, indicate that insanity did 
not enter into either. We cite: 
Where the facts surrounding appointment of a guardian 
negative any presumption that want of capacity was involved, 
no inference of want of testamentary incapacity arises from 
such appointment: 
In Re Bottger's Estate, 129 Pac. 2d 518 (Wash:). 
Where will was made at about same date petition for 
guardianship was filed by children; the petition was con-
tested, at eve of trial, testatrix. told lawyer she could not 
bear to take stand against children, it would kill her, re-
quired him to attempt settlement. Result, letters issued 
some time latter, upon finding testator was 92 years old, 
unable to read or write English, without business exper-
ience, and that she consented to appointment of guardian. 
Court says: 
"We are of the opinion that the fact that a guardian has 
been appointed to conserve the estate of one adjudged to 
be incompetent to manage it herself does not necessarily 
tend to establish lack of capacity on the ward's part to ex-
ecute a will, (whether the adjudication of incompetency 
precedes or follows the execution of the will), unless ·the 
order appointing the guardian is based upon an express 
finding of some mental defect inconsistent with the pos-
session of the capacity required for the execution of a 
will. The appointment of a guardian is not an adjudication 
that the ward is insane nor does it in all cases imply that 
the ward is not fully capable of making a valid testamen-
tary disposition of her property." 
In Re Cowdrey, 77 Vt. 359; 3 Ann. Cas. 70. 
Testatrix was old, public charge for many years, unex-
pectedly inherited $6,000'.00-a large sum at that time. She 
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asked for appointment of guardian under a statute which 
the Court interprets an affording guardianship in just such 
cases as does our Section 102-13-20. (supra). Held 
"Adjudication of mental incapacity- to take care of her-
self or her property and the appointment of a guardian 
thereunder did not render her prima facie mentally in-
capable of making a will." 
Keenan v. Scott, 225 Pac. 906 (Okla.). (Cited by Appel-
lant). 
Ross made deeds on August 4, 7, 11th-killed a negro on 
August 12th, was adjudicated insane and admitted to men-
tal hospital August 13th, and his guardian thereupon ap-
pointed sued to set aside the deeds. Evidence of a brother 
was given, of statements by Ross indicating delusions, and 
evidence by Notary who witnessed deeds and others in-
dicating capacity. The Court held the evidence insufficient 
to cancel the deeds, saying: 
"No question at all had ever been raised as to Ross' in-
capacity to transact business until the escapade occurred 
at Muskogee, evidently on the 12th day of August, wherein 
he killed a negro, and the plea of insanity was evidently 
interposed at a very opportune time." 
I 
In re Ames, 67 Pac. 737 (Ore.). (Cited by Appellant). 
Ames, accused of sodomy by a stepson and another, 
blackmail involved, sought counsel from attorneys who 
advised both the making of a will and a request for ap-
pointment of a guardian for his estate. Will executed, 
guardian applied for and named the same day. Guardian-
ship applied for on ground of poor memory, feebleness, and 
that persons were trying to impose on him and defraud 
him of his property. On proof of the guardianship, the 
lower court held the will invalid for want of testamentary 
capacity. Circuit Court, saying that th~ evidence did not 
show testator was not of sound and disposing mind and 
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memory when he made will, directed that will be admitted 
to probate and the Supreme Court affirmed. 
Kelley v. Stanton, 118 A. 863 (Md.). 
Lower court rejected will upon proof of guardianship 
some 16 months subsequent to execution, and weak testi-
mony of witness as to incompetency. Appellate Court while 
holding evidence of the guardianship proceeding admis-
sable, ruled directed verdict in favor of will should have· 
been granted saying: 
"It was not, however, conclusive, but its force and effect 
depended upon the other evidence in the case, and in the 
absence of evidence connecting tht mental condition of 
the tes~ator as described by the inquisition with a want of 
testamentary capacity at the date of the will, the inquisi-
tion alone would be insufficient to show such incapacity." 
In Re Dol bear, 86 Pac. 695 (Cal.). 
Where proof that testatrix committed suicide less than 
three months after executing will, that her mother also 
was a suicide, and that her father's family had had insane 
members, with some weak evidence from witness as to 
mental condition was held insufficient, as against strong 
evidence of those who saw her at and about time of making 
will and shortly thereafter that she was sane and capable. 
The court said: 
"The presumption always is that a person is sane. Proof 
of insanity carries back no presumption of ~ts past exis-
tance." 
Keillein v. Krauss, 209 SW 933 (Mo.). 
"Such testimony as to mental conditioh at other times 
has no probative value as to the mental condition at the 
time of execution of an instrument in question in the face 
testimony, nowhere directly questioned, that the testator 
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was of sound mind and disposing memory at the time the 
will and codicil were made." 
See also note 168 A. L. R. 972, previously cited. 
Tested by the rules laid down in these cases, there is evi-
dently nothing in the records of what took place after the will 
was executed which warrants any inference that the testator 
was insane at a later date. It is not enough that he was returned 
to the Provo Hospital, it is. not enough that he again had his 
property placed under guardianship. To create a presumption of 
insanity at a later date, the proceedings must have want of 
sanity as a basis, and without such want appearing, they create 
no presumption that he was insane when the will was made. 
They are explainable on another basis. 
Chongas may have been guilty of miserliness in seeking 
to obtain further treatment from the State Hospital, or may 
have simply felt that the treatment for his diabetes there given 
had been more beneficial than that had elsewhere. But what 
he did to obtain further treatment bespeaks intelligence, not 
lunacy. ' 
(b) Both proceedings were void and invalid, and invalid 
insanity and guardianship proceedings create no presumptions 
of insanity, prior or subsequent. 
"The adjudication is generally held inadmissable if the 
proceeding in which it was made was void. regardless of 
the nature of the defect which rendered the proceeding 
void." 
7. ,A. L. R. 578 and 68 A. L. R. 1312-note (e). 
As to invalidity of the order of recommitment, it should 
be sufficient to direct attention to the Utah Code provisions as 
to recommitment. 
First: If he has been released to some relative or friend 
under bond, (Section 85-7-28 and 85-7-29) and it is brought to 
the knowledge of the judge that the person thus removed ic; 
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not cared for properly, or is dangerous to persons or property, 
he may order such person to be returned to the hospital. 
Secor1d: If he has been discharged after commitment, and 
"has a recurrence of his nervousness", he may be recommited 
(Section 85-7-52) by a judge upon application of a guardian, 
etc., stating that he "has a recurrence of his nervousness or is 
not cared for properly, or is dangerous to persons or property 
. and is in need of further care and treatment", the committing 
officer "after hearing the evidence and being convinced that 
said person is in need of further treatment for his nervous con-
dition" to make an order of recommitment, the form of which 
is prescribed by the section, and which differs materially from 
that here used. 
We direct the attention of the court to the want of any 
application, to the complete absence of any showing of the 
presence of any of the facts upon which, under either statute, 
the Court had power to order recommitment. The whole pro-
ceeding rests without any foundation of right or authority in 
law. If the order was under the first section, it was made wrong-
fully because Chongas had been restored to capacity, and had 
been discharged. An entirely new insanity proceeding was 
requisite in that case. If made under the second section, there 
was no application showing that he had a "recurrence of his 
nervousness", nor any application at all except Chongras' own 
statement that he needed "some insulin and other care." What-
ever may have been the opinion of the judge who made the 
order, we submit that the statute does not refer to a need or" 
care for ordinary ailments, such as diabetes, and that a recur-
rence which warrants recommitment is recurrence of just such 
a mental condition as warranted original commitment. No evi-
dence was heard showing any such condition. The recommit-
ment was plainly invalid. 
As to the appointment of Lepas as guardian thereafter, 
there was a total want both of pleading and of finding by the 
court of either insanity, or of his being not only "sic~ and un-
able to take care of himself and his property", but also, as the 
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statute provides, "and by reason thereof would be likely to be 
deceived or imposed upon by artful· and designing persons." 
The one statutory requirement is not sufficient, the statute 
requires both to concur. 
We submit that neither proceeding, upon the record here 
made, had validity, and that in the absence of validity, neither 
was entitled to be in the record, nor to be considered by the 
jury. 
Third: Other hospitalization, etc. 
Appellant says that in addition to the matters heretofore 
discussed he relies upon: 
Releases from Utah State Hospital. 
Confinement in St. Benedict's Hospital. 
Confinement in County Hospital, Weber County,' for 
the Indigent. 
The release found in Proponent's Exhibit No. 2, and filed 
in the Salt Lake Insanity proceedings, was not admitted in evi-
dence (Tr. 80), and its exclusion is not herein assigned as error. 
It was properly not admitted since it is without evidentiary 
value, hearsay, wanting in relevancy because made long sub-
sequent to the restoration to capacity, evidently a formaJ act 
done to close the record. That from Weber Co. File No. 1049, 
which recites that "the above patient was discharged, condition 
unchanged, from the Hospital April 14th, 1948" is equally ir-
relevant. Prior to April 14th, 1948, Nick Chongas had left the 
hospital, 'which he had entered voluntarily, freely and without 
any probation, he had been found sane and. able to handle his 
own affairs by the Weber County courts, and had managed 
those affairs for months; he had become ill, had died, had been 
buried. So he was "discharged April 14th, 1948." 
What is claimed for the confinement in St. Benedict's Hos-
pital and what is claimed for the residence at the County In-
firmary counsel does not say. The 'hospitalization, at the time 
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the will was made, at St. Benedict's was for diabetes. Has Ap-
pellant authority that a diabetic condition creates an inference 
of mental unsoundness? That Chongas was able to obtain ad-
mission to the County Infirmary where he might find com-
panionship, care, board, room, all at much less expense than 
he would have paid for private hospitalization, bespeaks not 
insanity, but an acute and informed sanity. He cherished his 
hard earned money, and he sought to save himself all expense 
he could, and miserliness is not insanity. 
To argue about these matters is like hitting at a pi"llow; 
there is no substance at which to strike a blow. We submit none 
of these matters have probative value upon the question of 
the testamentary capacity of Nick Chongas. 
Fourth: "Oral Testimony" relied upon. 
We have shown that what William Palitsas thought of the 
the testator's condition prior to his commitment became im-
material when, and for the same reason, that the evidence of a 
higher form that he was insane, the commitment, became im-
material. After his return, Palitsas testified only to seeing 
Chongas on one occasion, when he was trying to sell or rent a 
house which the witness thought he had already sold (Tr. 91). 
This was just after Nick left the hospital (Tr. 93). The record 
shows (Tr. 26) that Chongas did have a house, and that he did 
sell it after he had been restored to sanity, so that the basis 
for Palitsas' attempt to show subsequent insanity, from sale of 
what had been sold, falls down. 
Andrew Meintasis saw the testator for the first time in two 
or three years about six weeks before he died, thought him in-
coherent, "jumpy", "not all there" but "might have been mis-
taken about it." At that time, this diabetic was not far from 
his final illness. There was no showing that his condition was 
not due to the advanced state of his illness, or that what the 
witness observed had any connection with a mental condition 
had by Chongas at the time he executed his will. 
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Mr. Beezley, in impeachment of the testimony of the pro-
ponent as to the sanity of the testator, testified that sometime 
in the period when Mr. Fowles was in the legislature he had 
talked with Fowles who had told him that Chongas "was crazy 
as a bedbug" and that he sat on a stoql in a restaurant, all alone, 
gazing out of the window. Without commenting upon whether 
Mr. Fowles did or did not say that, or upon its weight as im-
peaching testimony, we submit that the conduct recited cer-
tainly did not warrant imputation of want of sanity. He sat on 
a stool, all alone, gazing· out of the window of the restaurant. 
What else had this lonely man, sick, feeling himself betrayed 
by the only relative whom he knew how to find-what else did 
he have to· do! 
What was the other testimony: None certainly supports 
want of testamentary capacity. The record as to possession of 
full capacity by Nick Chongas is full of both direct and in-
trinsic matters in s'upport of the will. The following points are 
not disputed: 
(a) Chongas had ability to understand 'Yhat he was doing 
when he executed the will. 
He began to discuss a change in the will which left his 
estate to Appellant at the time of the proceedings for restora-
tion to capacity three month before date of execution. He re-
iterated that at several subsequent times. 
He visited Mr. Soderberg-alone let us insist-some ten 
days or more before the will was signed, and gave instructions 
as to his intentions. 
He caught, on first reading of the will to him on February 
3rd, the error made by Mr. Soderberg in omitting the name of 
a brother from the wilL 
He showed caution and an acute desire to be sure the will 
carried out his wishes by requesting Mr. Stamos to read it to 
him in his nativ'e language. 
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(b) The will was such as a sane testator might well have 
made. He recognized, along with his brothers and sisters, the 
friend with whom he had lived, and who had rescued him from 
the State Hospital. He omitted provision for the half-brother 
who had proferred to take care of him, and then, after one day, 
and after getting his $1,000, had sent him first to the County 
Hospital, had then caused his commitment, and had opposed his 
restoration to capacity. He did not know what had become of 
the immediate members of his family, whether they were living 
or dead, so he provided for what should occur as to any legacy 
which lapsed by death, and saw to it that, if his brothers or sis-
!ers could not be found, none of his estate would go to Paul 
C. Porcker. Given the circumstances which surrounded him, 
his want of knowledge as to his family, his dislike of his broth-
er, the will is just what might be anticipated of the most in-
telligent and sane testator. 
(c) The evidence of the attesting witnesses is clear as to 
capacity, and was based upon both acquaintance with Mr. 
Chongas, and upon observation at the time the will was signed. 
It establishes his testamentary capacity at that time, and it is. 
not challenged by any of the other evidence . 
. Testimony of attesting witnesses, clearly and positively 
showing facts warranting their belief in the sound mental con-
dition of the testator, and their conclusions of testamentary 
capacity drawn therefrom are ordinarily given great weight by 
courts in will contests. 
Ann. Cas. 1914 D 343 and cases cited. 
123 A. L. R. 89, (note). 
In Wade v. Sayre, heretofore cited, ( 123 S. E. 59) upon a 
record showing a prior commitment, no restoration, but a dis-
charge on probation, ~nd the evidence of some eleven non-ex-
pert witnesses that the grantor of the deed there in dispute 
was not sane, opposed by the testimony of the person who took 
the acknowledgements that he had examined the grantor sep-
arate and apart as to her knowledge of the nature of the act she 
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was doing, that she understood and was sane, as well as that of 
others as to her sanity at or about the time of the execution of 
the instrument, the Court set aside the judgment, although 
under the rules of West Virginia the lower court's findings 
were to be followed if supported by evidence, saying 
"We do not think the bare opinion of non-expert wit-
nesses will overcome the presumption that the plaintiff 
was incompetent to make the conveyance at the time it was 
made especially in view of the testimony of the officers 
, and others present at the time of execution of the same, 
who testified that the plaintiff was sane at the time." 
In the Bottger and Ames will cases, heretofore cited, the 
Appellate Court not only held the evidence insufficient, but 
held that the record was such as to require ,the will being es-
tablished. In Kelly v. Stanton (supra) it was held that the court 
should have granted a directed verdict. The rules as to when 
such a verdict should be granted are well settled: 
"judges need not submit a question to a jury unless there 
is evidence upon which the jury could properly find a ver-
dict.-It has been held that an issue should be submitted 
to a jury where the evidence has sufficient weight to be 
pertinent or conduces in any reasonable degree to estab-
lish the fact in controversy, or if there is any credible evi~ 
dence which, to a reasonable mind, can support an infer-
ence, in favor of a party to an action.-Under the modern 
doctrines in this regard, an issue should not be submitted 
to the jury where there is only a scintilla of evidence, where 
the evidence barely raises a conjecture in support of the 
view sought to be established, or where there is no sub-
stantial evidence." (53 Am. jur. 152). 
"Evidence which merely makes it possible for the facts 
in issue to be as alleged, or which raises a mere conjecture, 
surmise, or suspicion, presents no question of fact for 
submission to the jury and should not be left to the jury, 
it being error to do so; the rule being that, to justify sub-
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mission to the jury, the proof must be sufficient to raise 
more than a mere conjecture or surmise that the fact is 
as alleged." (64 C. j. 312). 
Excluding the evidence of the first commitment, because its 
effect was negatived by the latter finding of sanity, excluding 
the matters relating to the return of Mr. Chongas to the hos-
pital, and to the subsequent guardianship proceeding, not only 
because they were void and so of no evidentiary value at all, 
but also because they were not based upon facts giving rise to 
an inference of testamentary incapacity, we have left really 
only the testimony of Andrew Meintasis. It seems difficult to 
conceive that any jury of reasonable men could find on that 
testimony that something over a year earlier, Nick Chongas 
had been wanting in such soundness of mind and memory, as 
to render his will invalid. 
APPELLANT'S ASSIGNMENT No.2 
(a) Exclusion from the record of the so-called Physician's 
Certificate is justified, both by the want of compliance with 
requirements of law for such a record, and by the matter 
therein contained, not properly part of the record, nor respon-
sive to matter to questions therein asked, which were hearsay 
and not the best evidence of matters there shown. 
The Statutes of this State, (Sections 85-7-21 and 85-7-22, 
Utah Code, Ann. 1943) set out the duties of physicians called 
in by the Court in insanity proceedings, and the matters which 
substantially must appear in the Physician's Certificate to be 
filed in such cases. 
The first statute cited requires that "after a careful hear-
ing of the evidence, and a personal examination by the phy-
sicians of the person alleged to be insane, they shall certify 
on oath whether or not the person is insane, whether the case 
is of temporary or curable character, whether the person has· 
a homicidal, suicidal or incendiary mania, or whether he is 
dangerous, if at large, to other persons or to the property of 
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the community in which he shall live" and obtain so far as pos-
sible correct answers to the questions set out in the statutory 
form, which is given in the last section cited. As to these points: 
Omitting matter where any substantial or partial com-
pliance with the statutes appears, the following objections lie 
to this so-called Certificate. 
1. It does not contain the statement, required expressly 
by statute, as to whether the case is of temporary or curable 
character. No place for such a statement appears in the form. 
2. Although the form contains blanks for answers as to 
whether the alleged insane person has a disposition to injure 
himself, others, or to destroy or burn property, those blanks 
are left without answer,. although such answers are explicitly 
required. 
3. The oath, which contains place for a statement show-
ing that the physicians personally examined Mr. Chongas, is 
left blank in that particular. 'Nor do the physicians certify as 
to whether Mr. Chongas was or was not psychotic, that his 
departure from normal was or was not such as to endanger 
health, person or property. 
4. The form used does not contain any place for a state-
ment by the physicians of information upon questions Nos. 
15, 18, 19, the sub-questions under 23, the first four questions 
under 31, No. 33, and No. 34 of the form. Yet the question as 
to whether Mr. Chongas had rational intervals, (No. 34), wheth-
er there had been a prolonged departure from his usual course 
of conduct, (No. 15) as to what peculiarity or defect the phy-
sicians noted in the patient (No. 18) and as to what permanent 
hallucinations or delusions were noted in the patient (Nos. 18 
and 19) are matters very pertinent to the inquiry which was 
before the Court in the trial of this case. 
To' the question as to when departure from the normal 
took place (12th line of the certificate) no answer is given. And 
the answers which follow to the other questions in that line 
26 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
are largely inept. Certainly for a man who had been treated 
for diabetes, as had the testator, to think he had diabetes would 
not be a symptom of insanity, particularly when the physicians 
themselves certify on the next page that he possibly did have 
it. Nor is his having been in the S. P. Hospital for treatment 
a symptom of insanity. As to his half brother seeming to be 
somewhat afraid of him, that is pure hearsay, no symptom of 
anything, and as to this Appellant a very self-serving state-
ment. 
At the bottom of this page the following appears: 
"Q. Have any relatives suffered from or been treated 
for nervous or mental disease? 
"Brother says a Dr. Brown of Ogden told him to send 
him to Provo." 
Admission of this portion of Exhibit 2 in evidence would 
have placed that damaging statement before the jury, as part 
of a public record, bearing probably to their minds some of-
ficial stamp of verity. It most certainly is a self-serving state-
ment from the Appellant-it is not responsive, and the purest 
hearsay. Appellant certainly knows, if any such statement ever 
was made him, what Dr. Brown it was that so stated, but he 
did not call that physician as his witness at this trial. The dan-
ger of admitting such testimony needs no further argument. 
Turning to the next page we find that the physicians set 
out, to the question as to what "false ideas" Chongas may have 
had: 
"Believes his brother is the cause of all his troubles. Has 
some somantic complaints. Wanders about in hospital." 
That Chongas believed his brother the cause of his 
"trouble" is probably true, and if the trouble meant is his in-
carceration in the County Hospital in lieu of being given resi-
dence at the brother's home, which seems to be the only trouble 
Nick then was in, the statement is no false idea. Admitted, it 
would have had its effect in inducing a jury to believe that 
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Porcker's treatment of his brother was not what Chongas des-
cribed it as being. That Chongas had some somantic complaints 
-i. e. was a hypochondriac-falls under the "false idea" head, 
but if people who have imaginary illnesses are subjects for in-
carceration in mental hospitals, many of us would find our 
way there, and the state would have to enlarge its facilities 
multifold. And what connection there is between the patient, 
not bedfast, not voluntarily there, wandering about the hos-
pital, and a "false idea" we are unable to determine. 
The whole proceeding, for that matter, hardly conforms 
to the requirements of due process. True, the Warrant of Com-
mitment recites that the Court caused "Nick Chongas to be 
brought before me for examination as to his sanity," but that 
any notice was given him of the hearing, any opportunity to 
defend against the charges of Paul Porckas, that the District 
Attorney was present to represent the State and see that jus-
tice was done,-none of these facts appear. The physicians 
show no examination made of the alleged incompetent. Were 
Chongas present, himself testifying to what he told Mr. Fowles 
as to his being spirited from County Hospital to Mental Hospital 
without any knowledge of these proceedings, we would con-
tend that· the proceedings were invalid. In a collateral matter 
such as this, the right to do so is somewhat doubtful, if all 
statements in the record are given full creoence, and we shall 
not spend further time on this. But it's not a good record to 
warrant such a commitment. 
We submit that this "Certificate" was not admissable be-
cause not made in conformity with law, and because it car-
ried with it hearsay evidence, and irrevelant statements not 
responsive to the questions to which appended. 
(b) Had its admission been proper, still exclusion of this 
"Physician's Certificate" did not constitute reversible error. 
This was a part of the record of the original insanity pro-
1ceedings upon which commitment resulted. From it Appellant 
claimed a right to show the diagnosis of dementia praecox, and 
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to base thereupon expert testimony that Chongas, suffering 
with that disease, was never thereafter sane. 
Respondent while objecting to the admission of the certifi-
cate as proof of fact of the statements therein contained, did 
not object to its proffer as showing what took place at the 
hearing. (Tr. 69) But Appellant insisted upon offering it to 
show factual existance of dementia praecox, (Tr. 69) even 
claiming that there was an "adjudication" of the facts from that 
record. Our position is: 
That Chongas was committed to the State Hospital as in-
sane was a fact, a fact established by this record. That he the 
physicians believed be was insane from dementia praecox is 
likewise a fact, which could be established by this certificate. 
Based on it, Appellant desired to prove dementia praecox an 
incurable disease, and that, it being incurable, there never 
thereafter was a time when Chongas was sane. 
The trouble with that argument is that the exhibit does 
not establish that he did have dementia praecox. It establishes 
only that such was the diagnosis. It could not be substituted 
for proof of the fact by direct testimony. The record and its 
presumptions ceased to evidence mental incapacity, at the 
time of execution of the will, when Chongas' subsequent sanity 
and capacity was established by the proceedings for restoration 
which created a new and strong presumption of sanity. That 
judgment that he was sane negatived the presumption that the 
physicians correctly diagnosed his trouble; it established that 
he had no fixed, incurable, continuing insanity. Any prior pre-
sumptions from the insanity record then ended any right to 
base expert testimony on the contradicted presumptions ended. 
To hold otherwise would be to create this contradictory 
situation: The presumption that he was insane established by 
the proven fact of commitment ends, and has no more effect 
in the case, but the best guess-Dr. Wight (Tr. 74) said that 
is what a diagnosis sometimes is-of the physicians would be 
considered as not rebutted. The diagnosis was not admissable 
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for that purpose because for that purpose it is not only re-
butted, but is hearsay-just as the evidence from Palitsas (Tr. 
87-8) as to what Dr. Brown said to him was hearsay, and should 
have been excluded on our objection,-and certainly is not 
evidence of testamentary incapacity. 
It follows that whether or not the Physician's Certificate 
was admitted, no reversible error occurred. Admitted it would 
have had no more probative weight that the commitment. Ad-
mitted, it would not have afforded ground for a question, ad-
dressed to an expert witness, based upon the assumption that 
Chongas suffered from dementia praecox at the time he ex-
ecuted his will. This Court has held too often that error, which 
cannot affect the result, gives no groun~ for reversal for cita-
tion of authority to be needed. 
We submit that the trial Court's Judgment should be sus-
tained. 
Respectfully submitted, 
STUART P. DOBBS 
H. A. SODERBERG 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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